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Theexistenceofcooperationandsocialorderamonggeneticallyunrelatedindividualsisafundamentalprobleminthebehavioural
sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour—
unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice.
Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is,
however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self-interest approach has
serious shortcomings because itoverlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selﬁsh or greedy
intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These
ﬁndings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair
sanctions, and they are probably relevant inall domains in whichvoluntary compliance matters—in relations between spouses, in
the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.
Human societies are characterized by an unprecedented division of
labour supported by a myriad of social and economic exchanges
and compliance with social norms
1,2. Norm compliance and the
exchange of favours, goods and services pervade every aspect of
human life. They shape the interactions in families, neighbour-
hoods, schools, ﬁrms, markets and politics. The crucial feature of
any exchange is that the parties involved have to trust each other. If
the exchange partners had doubts about the other’s reliability most
exchanges would not take place. In fact, much of the economic
backwardness in the world can plausibly be explained by a lack of
mutual conﬁdence inhibiting cooperation in the production and
the exchange of goods and services
3,4.Y e t ,w h a te n s u r e st h a t
exchange partners trust each other? In modern societies one
solution is to conclude a legally enforceable contract that regulates
all aspects of the exchange—in particular, the sanctions imposed on
those who breach the contract. If the punishment for breaching the
contract is large enough, it is in the self-interest of the involved
parties to fulﬁl their obligations because otherwise they will be
heavily punished.
For millennia, however, humans have not been able to rely on
contracts because there were no impartial courts enforcing volun-
tary agreements. Even today it is typically not possible to regulate
transactions in every detail, and frequently the courts are unable to
verify who violated an agreement. Therefore, even in modern
societies the overwhelming majority of all social and economic
exchanges are not based on complete and legally enforceable
contracts but on implicit agreements and social norms lacking
explicitly speciﬁed sanctions for non-compliance
5,6. In such situ-
ations there are ample opportunities for cheating the exchange
partner to one’s own advantage. It is the ubiquity of such cheating
opportunities that renders altruistic cooperation important.
Altruistic cooperators are willing to cooperate, that is, to abide by
the implicit agreement, although cheating would be economically
beneﬁcial for them. Much recent research indicates that altruistic
cooperation is an important behavioural force
7–11.
However, the prevailing theoretical approaches in biology
12–17
and economics
18,19 neglect costly altruistic behaviour that does not
yield future economic beneﬁts for the altruist. Individuals are
supposed to do others a favour only if they can themselves reap
direct
12,13 or indirect
14–17 future beneﬁts from such others. Likewise,
individuals are supposed to cheat on agreements unless they are
sufﬁciently rewarded for compliance or sanctioned for non-com-
pliance. This axiom of self-interested behaviour implies that the
only remedy for the compliance problem lies in the provision of
sufﬁcient rewards or sanctions. Yet, if these incentives for
cooperation undermine altruistic behaviour the remedy may do
more harm than good because it aggravates the compliance prob-
lem
5,20–23. Inﬂuential social scientists have hypothesized that econ-
omic incentives might undermine altruism
20,21 but so far it has been
impossible to provide compelling evidence from uncontrolled ﬁeld
studies.
Capturing trust and altruistic cooperation
We examine the question of how sanctions intended to prevent
cheating affect human altruism in a sequentially played social
dilemma experiment with real monetary stakes. In each trial of
the experiment two mutually anonymous subjects are involved—
onesubjectintheroleofinvestor,theotheroneintheroleoftrustee.
First, the investor has the chance of choosing a costly trusting
action. Then the trustee is informed about the investor’s action and
he can honour the investor’s trust by taking a costly cooperative
action. Thepayoffrulesoftheexperiment ensurethat iftheinvestor
chooses a trusting action and the trustee responds cooperatively
both players increase their monetary payoff. However, the trustee
alsohastheoption ofnothonouringtheinvestor’strust.Inthiscase
thetrusteesavesthecostsofcooperationbuttheinvestorisworseoff
than if he had not been trustful. Because a cooperative action is
costly for the trustee the trustee is tempted not to honour the
investor’s trust. Yet, if the investor expects that the trustee will not
honour his trust the investor will not choose a costly trusting action
intheﬁrstplace.Thus,thesubjects arecaughtinadilemmabecause
trust and cooperation is beneﬁcial for both subjects but the trustee
faces the temptation not to cooperate and, therefore, the investor is
tempted not to trust.
To examine potential detrimental effects of sanctions on human
altruism we implement two experimental conditions—an incentive
condition and a trust condition. In the trust condition, cooperation
of the trustee cannot be achieved by incentives because there are no
rewards or sanctions available to the investor. The trustee’s
cooperation in this condition provides, therefore, a baseline
measure of altruism because—in the absence of economic incen-
tives—purely selﬁsh trustees will never cooperate. In the incentive
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cooperated sufﬁciently. The incentive condition informs us, there-
fore, whether there are detrimental effects of sanctions on the
trustee’s altruism. In particular, if the amount of cooperation is
higher in the absence of the sanction that would be evidence of a
detrimental effect.
The details of the trust condition areas follows. Both the investor
and the trustee receive an endowment of ten money units (MUs).
The investor has the option to trust his partner by sending between
zero and ten MUs of his endowment to the trustee. The experi-
menter then triples any amount sent so that if the investor sends,
say, 10MUs the trustee receives 30MUs. The tripling of the invest-
ment mimics a situation where the trustee has superior productive
opportunities for the use of economic resources. If the investor
transfers money to the trustee he also has to specify a ‘desired back-
transfer’ that can be any amount between zero and the tripled
transfer. In the previous example, for instance, where the investor
sent 10 and the trustee received 30MUs, the desired back-transfer
canbeanyamountbetweenzeroand30MUs.Oncetheinvestorhas
made his investment the trustee is informed about the amount sent
and the desired back-transfer. Then the trustee has the option to
cooperate by choosing the actual level of the back-transfer. The
trustee is free to send any amount between zero and the tripled
transfer—in our example, up to 30MUs—back to the investor. The
back-transferisnottripledby theexperimenter—ifthetrusteesends
back, say, 8MUs the investor receives exactly 8MUs.
The ﬁnal payoff of the investor is given by his endowment of
10MUs minus the transfer to the trustee plus the actual back-
transfer of the trustee. The payoff of the trustee is given by the
endowment of 10MUs plus the tripled transfer minus the actual
back-transfer. Thus, if there is no trust and cooperation the
investor’s transfer and the trustee’s back-transfer are zero. In this
case, both earn just their endowment of 10MUs. This is the
predicted outcome if both subjects are fully selﬁsh and the investor
anticipates the trustee’s selﬁshness. In the trust condition, a selﬁsh
trusteewillneverpaybackanythingand,therefore,aselﬁshinvestor,
who anticipates the trustee’s behaviour, will transfer nothing. Yet,
trust and cooperation can render both subjects better off. If the
investor trusts fully and sends 10MUs and the trustee’s actual back-
transfer is 20MUs the investor earns 20MUs, and the trustee earns
his endowment of 10 plus the tripled transfer of 30 minus the back-
transfer of 20, which in total also gives 20MUs.
The incentive condition is exactly identical to the trust condition
except for one feature: the investor can impose a ﬁne of four MUs
onthetrusteeiflessthanthedesiredamounthasbeensentback.Yet,
the investor can also refrain from imposing the ﬁne. The trustee
need not be ﬁned even if he pays back less than the desired amount.
At the time when the investor chooses the transfer and the desired
back-transfer he also has to specify whether to impose a ﬁne for the
case that the trustee’s actual back-transfer is lower than the desired
one. Thus, when the trustee makes his decision in the incentive
condition he knows whether the investor has chosen the ﬁning
option. To avoid evocative language the experimental instructions
do not include value-laden terms like ﬁne or punishment. Instead,
the ﬁne is described, more neutrally, as a deduction from the
trustee’spayoff.Theﬁneaffectsonly thetrustee’spayoffbyreducing
his earnings by 4MUs in the case of an insufﬁcient back-transfer.
The ﬁne does not affect the investor’s payoff directly. However, the
investor can use the ﬁne to affect the trustee’s back-transfer. In the
incentive condition, a selﬁsh trustee who does not face a ﬁne will
never pay back anything. Only if he faces a ﬁne will he be ready to
pay back up to 4MUs. For instance, if the desired back-transfer is
3MUsthetrusteeisbetteroffbyactually payingback3MUsinstead
of paying the ﬁne of 4MUs. Therefore, if the world were populated
only byselﬁshsubjects weshouldobservethatallinvestorsimpose a
ﬁne and that only if a ﬁne is imposed will the trustees pay back a
positive amount. In such a world the available sanction would be
used to enforce the cooperation of selﬁsh trustees, and altruistic
cooperation would be absent.
All the interactions in the experiment took place anonymously
and each pair of subjects played the experiment only once. This
means that repeated interactions
12,13 or reputation formation
14–17
cannot account for positive back-transfers. In the absence of a ﬁne,
positive back-transfers can, therefore, be characterized as altruistic
cooperation. Likewise, if the investor imposes a ﬁne, back-transfers
exceedingtheﬁneof4MUsrepresentaltruisticcooperationbecause
selﬁsh trustees will never pay back more than 4MUs.
Sanctions and altruistic cooperation
In our ﬁrst experiment, 24 pairs of subjects participated in the trust
condition and 45 pairs in the incentive condition. To examine the
motives behind the investors’ choices in more depth we later
conducted an additional experiment with 50 pairs in the incentive
condition. Figure 1 shows the behaviour of trustees in the two
conditions of our ﬁrst experiment. In contrast to the self-interest
hypothesis the trustees paid back substantial amounts of money in
all conditions. In addition, back-transfers were increasing in the
investors’ transfer, indicating the reciprocal nature of human altru-
ism. This kind of altruism should not, however, be confused with
the notion of “reciprocal altruism” as deﬁned by Trivers
12. In our
experiment there are no repeated interactions so that trustees
cannot hope to receive future rewards from their current altruistic
acts. 19 of the 24 trustees (79%) in the trust condition paid back
more than zero. 29 of the 45 trustees (64%) in the incentive
condition paid back more than 4MUs. This conﬁrms that altruism
is an important force in our setting. More importantly, however,
there were striking differences in trustees’ altruism across con-
ditions (Fig. 1). For any interval of the investors’ transfers the
trustees’ back-transfers were highest when the investor voluntarily
refrained from the ﬁne in the incentive condition and lowest when
the investor imposed the ﬁne. The back-transfers in the trust
condition were always at an intermediate level. When the investor
voluntarily refrained from the ﬁne no trustee chose a back-transfer
of zero and 47% (7 out of 15 subjects) chose a back-transfer of
15MUs or more, yielding an average back-transfer of 12.5MUs
(Table 1). In contrast, if a ﬁne was imposed, 33% (10 out of 30
subjects)paidbacknothingandonly13%(4outof30subjects)paid
Figure 1 The average back-transfer of the trustees plotted as a function of the investors’
transfers. In the trust condition and the incentive condition the back-transfers of the
trusteesincreasewiththeinvestors’transfers—irrespectiveofwhethertheﬁneisimposed
ornot.Iftheinvestorsimposeaﬁneintheincentivecondition,trusteesreducetheirback-
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6MUs. This difference in back-transfers is signiﬁcant (Mann–
Whitney test, z  22.988, P  0.003, two-tailed), providing a
ﬁrst indication that the imposition of the ﬁne had detrimental
effects on altruistic behaviour.
One reason for the higher back-transfers in the absence of ﬁnes
could be that those investors who did not impose a ﬁne transferred
higher amounts to the trustees (Table 1). Investors who imposed a
ﬁne transferred 6.8MUs on average whereas those who refrained
from ﬁning transferred 8.7MUs (Mann–Whitney test, z  21.961,
P  0.050, two-tailed). Trustees tended to pay back more money
when they had receivedhigher transfers (Fig. 1),so the higher back-
transfers in the absence of the ﬁne could be due to the higher
transfers of the investors. To control for this effect we computed
the actual back-transfer as a percentage of the tripled investment
(Table1).Weﬁndthatiftheﬁnewasimposedthetrusteespaidback
30.3% of the tripled investment, and if investors voluntarily
refrained from ﬁning, signiﬁcantly more, 47.6%, was paid back
(Mann–Whitneytest,z  21.930,P  0.054,two-tailed).Asimilar
picture emerges if we examine how much the trustees paid back
relative to the desired back-transfer. If the ﬁne was imposed the
trustees paid back only 54.5% of the desired level whereas in
the absence of the ﬁne 74.1% of the desired level was paid back
(Table 1).
The negative impact of sanctions on altruistic responses is also
supported by a regression analysis, which controls for the investor’s
transfers and the desired back-transfers. Keeping these other factors
constant,usingtheﬁneintheincentivetreatmentreducedtheback-
transfers signiﬁcantly by 4.56MUs (t  2.380, P  0.020, two-
tailed). As a consequence, investors who did not use the ﬁne earned
signiﬁcantly more money (Mann–Whitney test, z  22.283,
P  0.022): 13.8MUs in the absence of the ﬁne and only 9.2MUs
when the ﬁne was imposed (Table 1). The imposition of the ﬁne
reduced the back-transfers by 4.56MUs, so it is tempting to assume
that trustees who decided to pay back less than the desired
amount—and hence had to pay the ﬁne—reduced the back-transfer
by the amount of the ﬁne. This was, however, not the case. Those
trustees who were actually ﬁned paid back 2.94MUs on average,
whereasthosewhotransferredbackthedesiredamount,sothatthey
did not have to pay the ﬁne, paid back 9.5MUs on the average. The
median back-transfer of those who actually had to pay the ﬁne was
zero MUs.
Whydosomany investorsintheincentivetreatment—two-thirds
(30 out of 45)—threaten to sanction the trustee if the threat is
associated with much lower back-transfers? We hypothesized that




8,9,11, could be the proximate cause. A strong reciprocator
is willing to sacriﬁce resources for rewarding behaviour that is
perceived as kind or fair and for punishing behaviour perceived as
hostile or unfair, even if reciprocation is costly and provides no
present or future material beneﬁts whatsoever
24. The variance in
trustees’ back-transfers is considerable, so the investor always faces
the risk of being cheated. Therefore, strong reciprocators will
impose a ﬁne in case of malfeasance even if it reduces their overall
earnings. Second, investors may simply not have anticipated the
detrimental effects of the incentive on the back-transfers.
To discriminate between these two hypotheses we conducted a
second experiment with 50 pairs of subjects in the incentive
treatment. In this experiment, we informed the investors about
the behaviour of the trustees in the ﬁrst incentive treatment. We
gave them two scatter diagrams that showed the trustees’ back-
transfers for every level of the investors’ transfers. One diagram
depicts the trustees’ behaviour when they faced the ﬁne, the other
one shows trustees’ behaviour in the absence of the ﬁne. If the
investors’ preferences for ﬁning were caused by false expectations
abouttheeffectsoftheﬁnetheyshouldchangetheirdecisionswhen
informed about the true effects of the ﬁne. This did, however, not
occur. Again, roughly two-thirds of the investors (34 out of 50)
preferred to ﬁne the trustees in case of non-compliance. This
suggests that the desire to punish cheaters is the reason for the
frequent use of the ﬁne.
Why do sanctions reduce altruistic cooperation?
All the other qualitative ﬁndings observed in the ﬁrst incentive
treatment were also replicated in our second experiment. In
particular, we again observed a sizeable increase in the back-
transfers if the investors voluntarily waived the possibility of
imposing the ﬁne. How can we explain this behaviour by trustees?
The notion of strong reciprocity can provide an answer to this
question, too. First, refraining from the threat of ﬁning, although
the threat is available, could itself be perceived as a fair act, which
Figure 2 Actual back-transfer as a percentage of tripled investment plotted as a function
oftheinvestors’desiredback-transfers.Thedesiredback-transferiscategorizedaslowif,
in the case that the trustee pays this back-transfer, the investor would earn the same or
less than the trustee. It is categorized as high if the investor would earn more than the
trustee. At low desired back-transfers the sanctioning threat reduces actual back
transfers in the incentive treatment but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant. At high
desired back-transfers the sanctioning threat has a large negative impact on the actual
back-transfersintheincentivecondition,indicatingthatifsanctionsareusedtoachievea
distributional advantage they strongly undermine altruistic cooperation.
Table 1 Average behaviour and payoffs of investors and trustees
Trust condition Incentive condition, ﬁne chosen Incentive condition, no ﬁne chosen
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Investment 6.5 6.8 8.7
Desired back-transfer as a percentage of tripled investment 59.9 67.4 63.7
Actual back-transfer 7.8 6.0 12.5
Actual back-transfer as a percentage of tripled investment 40.6 30.3 47.6
Actual back-transfer as a percentage of desired back-transfer 74.4 54.5 74.1
Investor’s payoff 11.3 9.2 13.8
Trustee’s payoff 21.8 22.4 23.5
Number of observations 24 pairs 30 pairs 15 pairs
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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to use the sanction to enforce an unfair distribution of income may
be perceived as hostile acts, inducing the trustees to reduce
cooperation.
A back-transfer of two-thirds of the tripled transfer equalizes the
trustee’s and the investor’s payoff. Therefore, we classiﬁed desired
back-transfersoftwo-thirdsorlessofthetripledtransferaslow,and
desired back-transfers above two-thirds of the tripled transfer were
classiﬁed as high. We ﬁnd that for low desired back-transfers the
imposition of the ﬁne decreases the actual back-transfers in the
incentive condition from 43% to 35.2% of the tripled transfer
(Fig. 2). This is evidence that the ﬁne itself diminishes altruistic
responses but the effect is not signiﬁcant (Mann–Whitney test,
z  20.520, P  0.603, two-tailed). A signiﬁcantly large effect
occurs, however, if the ﬁne is combined with high desired back-
transfers. In this case, the imposition of the ﬁne leads to back-
transfers of only 22% of tripled investments whereas voluntarily
refrainingfromﬁningelicitsback-transfersof60.1%(Fig.2,Mann–
Whitney test, z  22.262, P  0.024, two-tailed). In fact, if the ﬁne
is imposed and the desired back-transfers are high, 46% of the
trustees give back nothing and the average back-transfers are only
3.82MUs, which suggests that altruistic responses have largely
vanished.
Previous research on ‘public good’ experiments has shown that
altruistic punishment is a highly effective means of enforcing
cooperation
26. Why do the sanctions in the public good context
enhance cooperation but reduce cooperation in our context? Our
results suggest that the moral legitimacy of the sanction is a crucial
factor. In the public good context the punishment of ‘free-riders’ is
an altruistic act that is considered as morally legitimate. Therefore,
the disciplining effect of the sanctions is not undermined by a
declineinaltruisticcooperation.Inthepresentcontext,punishment
serves the punisher’s self-interest and, if it is used to enforce an
unfair payoff distribution in favour of the punisher, it decreases
altruistic responses. This interpretation is also supported by the
following fact. If the ﬁne is imposed in the incentive condition the
actual back-transfers as a percentage of tripled investments are
signiﬁcantly lower when the desired back-transfers are high than
when the desired back-transfers are low (Mann–Whitney test,
z  21.85, P  0.064, two-tailed).
In human societies, social orderand cooperation relyonboth the
use of rewards and sanctions, which ensures the compliance of self-
interested actors, and on the presence of people willing to perform
altruistic acts. However, as our experiments indicate, sanctions
intended to deter non-cooperation may backﬁre because they
undermine altruistic cooperation. Whereas altruistically motivated
sanctions for the beneﬁt of the group enhance cooperative beha-
viour, sanctions that are imposed to enforce an unfair distribution
ofresourceshavetheoppositeeffect.Thisisincontrasttoprevailing
approaches in economics, biology and behavioural ecology, which
predictcooperation-enhancingeffectsofsanctions,regardlessofthe
moral legitimacy or purpose of each sanction.
Our results, however, do not imply that economic incentives
generally have negative motivational effects. There is evidence
indicating that rewarding incentives and moralistic sanctions in




they are associated with greedy or selﬁsh intentions. We believe that
these insights are important for everyone who needs the voluntary
compliance of other people. A
Methods
The experiments were conducted with 238 students at the University of Bonn. They took
place in a large lunch room for students where we recruited subjects on the spot to
participate in the experiment. At noon the lunch room is visited by hundreds of students
from various disciplines. Each pair of subjects played the game just once and no subject
could participate in the experiment for a second time. At registration, subjects received an
instruction sheet (available from the authors upon request) that explained the rules of the
game, the payoff structure, the random and anonymous matching with another student
subject recruited at the same occasion, the conversion rate of experimental MUs into
GermanMarks andthe payment mode. Subjectswereprivately paid immediatelyafter the
experimental session. After having read the instructions, each subject was randomly
assignedtooneoftworoles(investorortrustee)andanonymouslymatchedwithasubject
in the other role. Investors received a blank decision sheet in which they had to ﬁll in the
transfer and the desired payback amounts. In the incentive condition, they additionally
had to mark one of two options ‘no deduction’ and ‘a deduction of 4MUs’ for the case
where the trustee would pay back less than the desired amount. While making their
decisions subjects were seated in a polling booth that we had brought to the lunch room.
Afteraninvestorhadmadehisthreedecisionsamonitorcheckedwhetherallthenecessary
informationwas on the decision sheet. Then the monitor handed the decision sheet to the
trustee with whom the investor was matched. The trustees had just one decision to make,
namely, to specify the back-transfer to the investor. After completion the decision sheet
was handed to the monitor who controlled for completeness and calculated the payoffs.
Immediately after their game wasover subjects werepaid. Special carewas takento ensure
the anonymity of the subjects and the privacy of the payment procedure. Each subject
received a ﬂat fee of DM3 (e1.53) for participation and each MU earned was rewarded
with DM0.5 (e0.26). On average an investor earned DM8.45 (e4.32) and a trustee earned
DM14.23 (e7.28). On average half an hour elapsed between registration and payment.
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